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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH BANK OF PLEASANT GROVE 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, a corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
No. 191 58 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant to recover 
under a Bond executed by defendant-respondent and a contractor. 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to recover from defendant-respondent, 
surety on the Bond, st.mis which plaintiff-appellant advanced to 
the contractor's materialmen and laborers pursuant to agreement 
with the contractor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable;< 
Sam presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, 
cause of action. A copy of the Order of Summary Judgment 
attached to Appellant's Brief as Appendix A. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent requests this Court to affi· 
the Order of the District Court dismissing this action w:· 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-respondent accepts plaintiff-appellant 
Statement of Facts as fairly describing the factual setting, 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE CLEAR TERMS 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS 
ACTION. 
OF THE BOND, 
NO CAUSE OF 
The Subcontract Labor and Material Payment Bond 
cuted by Allan T. Munn, dba ATM Masonry Company, (ATMI, 
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Surety Insurance Company of California, (SIC}, bound them unt< 
Valley Builders "for the use and benefit of claimants as herein° 
below defined". The Bond defined claimants as follows: 
"A claimant is defined as one having a 
direct contract with the Principal for 
labor, material, or both, used or 
reasonably required for use in the 
performance of the contract, labor and 
material being construed to include that 
part of water, gas, power, light, heat, 
oil, gasoline, telephone service or 
rental of equipment directly applicable 
to the subcontract. n 
By the express terms of the Subcontract Labor and 
Material Payment Bond, Wasatch is excluded from coverage under 
the Bond. Wasatch is not "one having a direct contract with the 
Principal" for labor and material. Rather, Wasatch is a provider 
of funds to ATM, with which ATM discharged its obligation under 
the Bond to make prompt payment to laborers and materialmen. As 
the Kansas Court noted in Neodesha National Bank v. Russell, 200 
P. 281 (Kans., 1921}: 
The bank is not in the position of 
having furnished labor or material that 
went into the building. The provision 
requiring public officials to take the 
bond was to protect persons furnishing 
labor or material 'used in the construc-
tion of public buildings, not to protect 
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money lenders advancing money to con-
tractors in financing the work of con-
struction." Id. at 282 
Wasatch, therefore, being excluded from coverage under the Be: 
has no claim thereunder and no basis on which to maintain a 
of action. 
POINT II 
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY PRECLUDES 
WASATCH FROM MAINTAINING ITS CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
Despite the clear language of the Bond which plain; 
precludes the claim of Wasatch against SIC, Wasatch nonetheles'j 
seeks to bring itself within the protect ion of the Bond under ' 
theory of equitable subrogation. This theory is asserted 
spite of the overwhelming weight of authority against it. t-' 
law on the subject is summarized in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contractor· 
~, SS 10 and 11 as follows: 
"Generally speaking, under the ordinary 
form of contractor's bond conditioned on 
the performance of the contract and the 
payment of all claims for labor and 
material, a lender of money to the 
contractor cannot recover the amount 
thereof from the surety, even though the 
borrowed money has been wholly applied 
to the payment of the cost of the labor 
-4-
and material actually used in the pro-
ject. Moreover, under a bond condition-
ed on the satisfaction of all claims for 
labor, material, encumbrances, or other-
wise, a surety is not liable for money 
loaned to the contractor expressly for 
paying the cost of labor and material. • 
It is quite uniformly held that even 
though money loaned to a building or 
construction contractor has been used in 
pay [sic] laborers or materialmen on the 
project, the lender is not thereby 
subrogated to the claims and rights of 
such laborers and materialmen against 
the contractor's bond." 
The rule is re-stated in 127 A.L.R. 974 as follows: 
"The well-established general rule is 
that a claim for money loaned or advanc-
ed to a building or construction con-
tractor is not within the coverage of 
the ordinary form of contractor's bond 
conditioned for the performance of the 
contract in the payment of all claims 
for labor and material, even though the 
borrowed money has been wholly applied 
to the payment of the cost of labor and 
material actually going into the con-
struction project." Id. at 976. Supp. 
164 A.L.R. 783. 
Numerous cases support this general proposition oi 
law. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hagen, 146 N.W.2d 876 (N.D., 1966), 
U.S. v. Western Contracting Corporation, 341 F.2d 383 (8 Cir., 
1965), Bower v. Tebbs, 314 P.2d 731 (Mont., 1957), Vershchoyle v. 
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Holifield, 123 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Comm.Ap., 1939), First Nati 0 , 
Bank of Chisholm v. O'Neil, 223 N.W. 298 (Minn., 1929), ~, 
Spencer, 265 P. 751 (Utah, 1928), Neodesha National Bank 
Russell, 200 P. 281 (Kans., 1921), U.S. v. Rundle, 107 F. ~. 
(9th Cir., 1901 ). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Paxton, supra., recogn1z' 
this well-established rule and stated as follows: 
"To hold the surety liable for advance-
ments made or money loaned to the con-
tractors to enable them to carry out the 
contract without the assent of the 
surety, unless the facts are such that 
it would be inequitable to not hold a 
surety liable, is to read into the 
contract a liability not assumed by the 
surety and a liability clearly not 
contemplated by the parties at the date 
of the execution of the bond. The 
authorities seem to be quite uniform in 
holding that a surety is not liable for 
advancements or loans made under circum-
stances similar to those appearing in 
this record." Id. at 753. 
See also U.S. v. Rundle, 107 F. 227 (9th Cir, 1901) ("[TJ:, 
protection afforded by the bond was to such only as might su~1 
the contractor with labor and materials in the prosecution of 
work. It did not extend to a bank which might lend money for 
purpose of paying for such work and materials.") 
terms of the Subcontract Labor and Material Payment Bond invc~ 
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in the instant case, its benefits extended only to those "havin<,; 
a direct contract with the Principal for labor, material, or 
both, used or reasonably required for use in the performance of 
the contract." It did not extend to those advancing funds to the 
principal to pay for labor and materials. This Court should not 
read into this Bond "a liability not assumed by the surety and a 
liability clearly not contemplated by the parties at the date of 
the execution of the bond" Paxton, supra., but should follow th~ 
overwhelming weight of authority and hold that Wasatch is not 
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of ATM's laborers and 
materialmen. 
POINT III 
BY EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS, WASATCH 
SHOULD BE DENIED EQUITABLE SUBROGATION. 
In an effort to wriggle out of the obviously adverse 
implications of the firmly established general rule mentioned 
above, plaintiff-appellant seizes upon language in the Paxton 
case wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated that a surety is not 
liable for advances or loans made under circumstances such as 
those involved in the instant case "unless the facts are such 
that it would be inequitable to not hold the surety liable", 
Paxton v. Spencer, supra., at 7 53. Plaintiff-appellant argues 
-7-
that this case comes within the above-stated exception. A rev 
of the facts of this case reveals the fallacy of plaintiff-ap~ 
lant's argument. 
In extending the line of credit to ATM, as with ac 
loan, Wasatch ran the risk that the money would not be repaic 
Hence, the bank expected to receive a fair return for the risk 
assumed and required security to protect the loan. There wa 
also the inherent risk, however, that the security would ~,: 
inadequate to protect the full value of the loan. In the presN 
action, Wasatch, for consideration, agreed to provide ATM witr.. 
line of credit to the extent of $50,000.00 and, as its so~ 
security, took an assignment of the contract payments from Valle! 
Builders. 
I 
Wasatch thereby assumed the risk that the loan or , 
part thereof would not be repaid, and further that the securit 
might prove inadequate. Finally, it assumed the risk that Vall; 
Builders would not honor the assignment. Wasatch now, however 
would have SIC, with whom Wasatch had no contractual relatior· 
ship, assume the risk which only Wasatch had assumed. Under t·· 
Bond, SIC did not assume any such risk. The Bond provided mere; 
"that if the Principal [ATM] shall promptly make payment to ai 
claimants as hereinafter defined, for all labor and material us' 
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or reasonably regui red for use in the performance of the subcon° 
tract, then this obligation shall be void." SIC assumed only the 
risk that the principal (ATM) would not pay materialmen and 
laborers. The fact is that ATM did indeed pay all materialmen 
and laborers. The effect of ATM's arranging with Wasatch for a 
line of credit with which to pay the materialmen and laborers was 
that ATM paid the materialmen and laborers. Under the terms of 
the Bond, it did not matter how ATM paid off the materialmen anC 
laborers - - whether it paid directly from funds received from 
Valley Builders or whether it paid by arranging a line of credit 
- - the essential and operative fact was that ATM pay, and this 
it did. Had ATM not paid the materialmen and laborers, whether 
by way of a line of credit with Wasatch or otherwise, SIC would 
have been liable under the Bond, which is the risk it assumed. 
However, the materialmen and laborers were paid and SIC should 
not be re qui red to assume a risk beyond the terms of its agree~ 
ment with ATM. 
POINT IV 
THE VOLUNTEER RULE, AS PROPERLY UNDER-
STOOD, APPLIES TO THIS CASE AND DENIES 
WASATCH'S CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE SUBROGA-
TION. 
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The plaintiff-appellant acknowledges the overwhelm. 
weight of authority in favor of the general rule stated abr 
but argues that the original basis for trie rule no longer ex 1 , 
and that the rule is inequitable. Plaintiff-appellant's argu~ 
is based on a criticism of the volunteer rule. However, pla:1 
tiff-appellant misconstrues the volunteer rule. 
The cases cited above recognize that a volunteer 
not, as plaintiff-appellant maintains, one who gratuitous: 
advances money for the payment of materialmen and laborer: 
These cases recognize that a bank or other creditor may advanc· 
money under con tr act expecting a profit in return, but still · 
considered a volunteer as far as the doctrine of equitable sue· 
rogation is concerned. For example, in Verschoyle v. Holifield 
123 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. C.A., 1939), the Court in applying tr. 
volunteer rule to the facts before it, states as follows: 
"In the state of affairs existing at the 
time when [the creditor] came to [the 
contractor's] aid, [the creditor] was 
liable neither primarily nor secondarily 
to the laborers or materialmen who later 
were paid with the funds advanced by 
him. He was not a party to the original 
contracts for the construction of the 
road, nor was he a party to the subcon-
tract. He was not a surety on either of 
the two bonds." 123 S.W.2d at 881 
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Another example is Neodesha National Bank v. Russell, 200 P. 281 
(Kans., 1921). In this case a bank loaned money to a contractor 
of a public building to pay for labor and material used in the 
construction work and took the contractor's notes in return. The 
interest-bearing notes were not paid and the bank sued the bond-
ing company to recover. Despite the fact that the bank did not 
gratuitously advance the money, but did so pursuant to interest~ 
bearing notes, the Court held that by loaning the money to the 
contractor, the bank was not entitled to subrogation to the 
rights of materialmen and laborers. The Court stated: 
"The bank was a mere volunteer; was 
under no obligation to become involved 
in the matter of the erection of the 
school building, except the usual desire 
of a bank to make a profit by loaning 
its money on interest.• 200 P. 281 
As these cases demonstrate, Wasatch is a volunteer for 
purposes of the doctrine of equitable subrogation despite the 
fact that it did not advance money to ATM gratuitously. There-
fore, the doctrine of equitable subrogation does not apply to 
this case and Wasatch has no claim against SIC. 
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POINT V 
WASATCH IS NOT A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
OF THE BOND AND HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
UNDER IT. 
Plaintiff-appellant argues that it is a third-par• 
beneficiary of the Bond executed by ATM and SIC. The genen. 
rule regarding third-party beneficiary contracts is as follows: 
•As a general proposition, the determin-
ing factor as to the rights of a third 
party beneficiary is the intention of 
the parties who actually made the con-
tract. The real test is said to be 
whether the contracting parties intended 
that a third person should receive a 
benefit which might be enforced in the 
courts. Thus, it is often stated that 
the contract must have been intended for 
the benefit of the third person in order 
to entitle him to enforce it. 
The question of whether a contract 
was intended for the benefit of a third 
person is generally regarded as one of 
construction of the contract." 17 
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, §304. 
Furthermore, a contract relied upon as authorizing recovery by' 
alleged third-party beneficiary must be strictly construed 
favor of the person against whom liability is asserted. 
Dawson v. Eldredge, 372 P.2d 414 (Ida., 1962). 
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The terms of the Subcontract Labor and Material Payment 
Bond are clear. There is no mistaking who the intended benefic-
iaries are. The Bond is "for the use and benefit of claimants as 
hereinbelow defined." The Bond defines a claimant as: 
"One having a direct contract with the 
Principal for labOr, material, or both, 
used or reasonably required for use in 
the performance of the contract.• 
(Emphasis added) 
No where in the language of the Bond or in the circum~ 
stances surrounding its execution is there any indication that 
the parties intended to benefit a lender who may advance money 
for the payment to materialmen and laborers. Thus, Wasatch is 
not a third-party beneficiary of the Bond and has no claim there-
under. 
CONCLUSION 
The terms of the Bond are clear. The Bond was intended 
to benefit those having a direct contract with the principal 
(ATM) for labor and material. It was not intended to benefit one 
such as Wasatch who advanced funds to allow ATM to pay laborers 
arxl materialmen. The Bond provided that if ATM promptly made 
payment to all materialmen and laborers, then the Bond obligation 
-1 3-
would be void. By securing a line of credit through Wasatch, 
discharged its responsibility to make prompt payment to 
materialmen and laborers, thereby voiding the Bond obligaliw 
SIC. Wasatch, in advancing the funds to ATM, assumed a cer•, 
amount of risk, for which it was compensated. This Court sho". 
not permit Wasatch to shift to SIC the burden of the risk assurr,, 
by Wasatch and for which it expected compensation. The cle, 
weight of authority is that a lender of money to a contract: 
cannot recover the amount thereof from a surety, even though:: 
borrowed money has been wholly applied to the payment of the w 
of the labor and material used in the project. This Cocr 
should, therefore, affirm the District Court's Order of Dism: 0 I 
sal. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of Septembe: 
1983. 
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